The evolution and function of play Jeffrey C Schank
The question of why some animals play has received serious scientific attention since Herbert Spencer (1872) published the first theory of the origin of play in his The Principles of Psychology. Spencer thought that play occurs when an animal builds up excess energy in its brain, which is then discharged as frivolous play behavior that imitates the animal's functional behaviors. Groos (1898) , in the first book dedicated to animal play, argued that Spencer's imitative theory could not explain why young animals play because they lack adult functional behaviors to imitate. Spencer then argued that a more plausible version of the excess energy theory would assert that frivolous play behaviors are instead instinctive behaviors discharged when excess energy is sufficiently high. Groos, however, did not believe that any excess energy theory of frivolous play was empirically or theoretically adequate. Empirical observations suggested that young animals play even when fatigued and therefore do so while lacking excess energy. Theoretically, Groos could not accept the idea that play is merely frivolous; play must be favored by natural selection in order to evolve. Groos instead proposed an adaptive theory of play, which postulated that animals inherit partial or incomplete instincts. Play by young animals allows them to practice incomplete instinctive behaviors, which over developmental time become adult functional behaviors. Thus, in Groos' adaptive theory of play, the function of play is practice and its adaptive benefit is the development of adult functional behaviors.
Today, although the details of both theories are not seriously entertained, the broad perspectives of frivolous versus adaptive play still frame the debate. In 2010, Gordon Burghardt and Sergio Pellis proposed a series of workshops on the evolution of play, which were sponsored by the National Institute of Mathematical and Biological Synthesis (NIMBioS) and held from 2011 to 2013. The aim of these NIMBioS workshops was to develop computational and mathematical models of the evolution and mechanisms of play with the aim developing a clearer and integrative understanding of the conditions under which play could evolve. The papers in this issue represent the first systematic use of computational and mathematical models to investigate the theoretical and empirical origins of play.
Pellis, Palagi, Burghard, and Mangle, in this issue, present a conceptual framework for understanding the evolution and mechanisms of play. A problem for purely adaptive approaches to the evolution of play is that play is sparsely distributed across animal phyla. Play has been identified in only five of 30 different phyla and most species that play are mammals (Burghardt, 2005) . If play as practice is essential for completing or fine-tuning adult functional behaviors during development, then play should be more common across phyla. In part to address this problem, they distinguish three types of play processes: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary process play is the most basic and expressed during an animal's development, it just satisfies criteria for play, and may not be adaptive. Once primary process play has evolved, it may be evolutionarily co-opted to serve adaptive functions in secondary and tertiary process play. The distinction between these different processes or levels of play integrates essential elements of the two nineteenth century views on the origin of play previously discussed. When there is resource abundance (i.e., surplus resource theory; SRT; Burghardt, 1984 Burghardt, , 2005 , primary process play may initially evolve without adaptive benefit. Once established, selection can co-opt primary process play to transform it into adaptive secondary and tertiary process play, which have adaptive benefits. This suggests that play is phylogenetically rare because initially it is typically not adaptive and requires resource abundance to evolve.
Alternatively, primary process play could be adaptive as argued by Sˇpinka, Newberry, and Bekoff (2001) . They theorized that primary process play functions to build a repertoire of behavioral responses to unexpected events. Interestingly, Cully, Clune, Tarapore, and Mouret (2015) designed a robot that could rapidly adapt to losing a leg by earlier developing a repertoire of locomotor behaviors during a ''developmental stage'' in which a large number of possible locomotor behaviors were simulated and evaluated for later use. If the adaptive benefits of primary process play lie in developing a repertoire of behaviors for future use, then the distinction between the ubiquitous exploratory behaviors of animals and play behaviors may not be a sharp distinction.
Whether or not primary process play is adaptive or frivolous in origin, social play, as secondary or tertiary play, may facilitate the acquisition of behaviors essential for adult cooperation and thereby evolve via delayed fitness benefits gained from adult cooperation. Durand and Schank, in this issue, theoretically investigated this hypothesis with a spatially explicit agentbased model using an evolutionary game theoretical approach. They found that learning to cooperate by engaging in social play resulted in delayed fitness benefits via adult cooperation even when populations initially lacked adult cooperation. Under these conditions, learning to cooperate by engaging in social play is initially costly but can evolve when there is population structure (i.e., groups can form) and is most favored under sexual reproduction.
If play initially evolves as non-adaptive and frivolous behaviors in a population, then play still requires an evolutionary mechanism for its evolution despite lacking adaptive benefits and having potential costs. Auerbach, Kanarek, and Burghardt, in this issue, developed a computational model to investigate this problem. Agents were asexual, semelparous, and could only rest or forage for resources. Play was a mutant strategy, frivolous, but with mortality and energy costs. They found that under certain conditions, play could spread through a population even though frivolous. They explain this counter intuitive result by indirect costs imposed on non-play agents by play agents.
As mentioned at the outset, the study of the origins of play behavior has lacked theoretical tools and approaches for understanding the evolution of play. Mangle and Grunloh, assuming a Groosian adaptiveperspective, develop a general state-dependent behavioral modeling framework and show how to simulate these models with stochastic dynamic programming. They show that by using a state-dependent modeling framework, in which models can be extended in a variety of ways, a deeper understanding of the evolution of play can be achieved through understanding how dynamics states of the individual (e.g., skill level) are related to reproductive success or fitness.
All previous models of play have focused on its evolution (Dugatkin & Bekoff, 2003 While play in young animals is phylogenetically uncommon, adult play is much more uncommon. Indeed, while most species with play are mammals and almost all young mammals play, adult play is rare in mammals except for primates (Pellis & Iwaniuk, 1999) . To conclude this issue, O'Meara, Graham, Pellis, and Burghardt, used phylogenetic logistic regression to assess the relationships of adult play in primates to various variables such as life-history, metabolism, and socioecological factors. Perhaps the most interesting result of O'Meara, Graham, Pellis, and Burghardt's phylogentic analysis is that-as with the general problem of understanding the evolutionary origins of playthe evolutionary relationships between such variables and adult play is more complicated than previously thought.
